Introduction to the Theory of Games

Preface. Introduction. <strong>I: Noncooperative games.</strong> <strong>1.</strong> Noncooperative games forms. <strong>2.</strong> Nash equilibria. <strong>3.</strong> Existence of Nash equilibrium. <strong>4.</strong> Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium. <strong>5.</strong> Mixed extensions of finite games. <strong>6.</strong> Computation of equilibria in mixed extensions of finite games. <strong>7.</strong> The oligopoly game. <strong>8.</strong> Two-person zero-sum games. <strong>9.</strong> Matrix games. <strong>10.</strong> Games played over the unit hypercube. <strong>11.</strong> Bimatrix games. <strong>12.</strong> Repeated games. <strong>13.</strong> Games with incomplete information. <strong>II: Cooperative games.</strong> <strong>14.</strong> Games in characteristic function form. <strong>15.</strong> The core. <strong>16.</strong> Stable sets. <strong>17.</strong> The nucleolus. <strong>18.</strong> The Shapley value. <strong>19.</strong> The kernel and the bargaining set. <strong>20.</strong> Game theory and cost allocation. <strong>21.</strong> Games without transferable utility. <strong>22.</strong> The Nash bargaining solution and its extensions. <strong>23.</strong> Two-person bargaining processes. Problems and exercises. Appendix. References. Index.